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Soccer clubs listed on the London Stock Exchange provide a unique way of testing stock price 
reactions to different types of news. For each firm, two pieces of information are released on a 
weekly basis: experts’ expectations about game outcomes through the betting odds, and the game 
outcomes themselves. The stock market reacts strongly to news about game results, generating 
significant abnormal returns and trading volumes. We find evidence that the abnormal returns for 
the winning teams do not reflect rational expectations but are high due to overreactions induced by 
investor sentiment. This is not the case for losing teams. There is no market reaction to the release 
of  new  betting  information  although  these  betting  odds  are  excellent  predictors  of  the  game 
outcomes. The discrepancy between the strong market reaction to game results and the lack of 
reaction to betting odds may not only be the result from overreaction to game results but also from 
the lack of informational content or information salience of the betting information. Therefore, we 
also examine whether betting information can be used to predict short-run stock returns subsequent 
to the games. We reach mixed results: we conclude that investors ignore some non-salient public 
information such as betting odds, and betting information predicts a stock price overreaction to 
game  results  which  is  influenced  by  investors’  mood  (especially  when  the  teams  are  strongly 
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reactions to different types of news. For each firm, two pieces of information are released on a 
weekly basis: experts’ expectations about game outcomes through the betting odds, and the game 
outcomes themselves. The stock market reacts strongly to news about game results, generating 
significant abnormal returns and trading volumes. We find evidence that the abnormal returns for 
the winning teams do not reflect rational expectations but are high due to overreactions induced by 
investor sentiment. This is not the case for losing teams. There is no market reaction to the release 
of  new  betting  information  although  these  betting  odds  are  excellent  predictors  of  the  game 
outcomes. The discrepancy between the strong market reaction to game results and the lack of 
reaction to betting odds may not only be the result from overreaction to game results but also from 
the lack of informational content or information salience of the betting information. Therefore, we 
also examine whether betting information can be used to predict short-run stock returns subsequent 
to the games. We reach mixed results: we conclude that investors ignore some non-salient public 
information such as betting odds, and betting information predicts a stock price overreaction to 
game  results  which  is  influenced  by  investors’  mood  (especially  when  the  teams  are  strongly 






        It  is  now  widely  acknowledged  that  individuals  have  limited  information  processing 
abilities.  As  Herbert  Simon  (1978:  13)  mentions  “many  of  the  central  issues  of  our  time  are 
questions  of  how  we  use  limited  information  and  limited  computational  ability  to  deal  with 
enormous problems whose shape we barely grasp”. As a consequence of this limited processing 
ability,  investors  may  concentrate  their  time  and  attention  to  highly  visible,  easy  to  process 
information. In other words, limited processing ability may generate limited attention. One of the 
consequences  is  that  reactions  to  public  news  depend  on  its  relative  salience:  the  higher  the 
information  salience  (i.e.  media  coverage),  the  faster  the  public  information  is  processed  by 
investors and is reflected in  the share  prices.  In  the  recent  past, several  articles  have reported 
empirical evidence about asset price reactions to public news consistent with the salience theory. 
Studying closed-end country funds, Klibanoff et al. (1998) show that country-specific information 
which does not receive large media coverage is incorporated only gradually into the share prices. In 
a case study, Huberman and Regev (2001) describe EntreMed’s substantial and permanent stock 
price rise after a ‘special report’ on new cancer-curing drugs on the front page of the Sunday edition 
of the New York Times (NYT). This is remarkable as the NYT article did not contain any new     2 
 
 
information:  the  potential  breakthrough  had  already  been  reported  five  months  earlier  in  the 
scientific press (an article in Nature) and in the popular press (including the NYT itself but then not 
on  a  prominent  place  –  in  a  tiny  article  on  page  A-28).  Chan  (2003)  studies  market  returns 
following prominent public news, i.e., firm-related information that made the headlines or a lead 
article, and finds that investors react slowly to bad news. A recent study by Gilbert et al. (2007) 
shows that investor inattention influences the aggregate stock market. 
Investors’  constraints  in  information  processing  are  not  only  characterized  by  ignoring 
relevant news but also by misinterpreting the relevance of news. In particular, studies on behavioral 
finance argue that investors are subject to sentiment (e.g. Delong et al., 1990).
1 Some recent papers 
study the impact of exogenous changes in investor emotions on share prices (e.g. Kamstra et al, 
2003). When arbitrage against sentiment-prone investors is risky and costly, mispricing may persist 
in financial markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). An example of investor sentiment is the study by 
Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2007) who investigate the impact of international soccer results on 
stock market indices. They find a significant market decline after losses by national soccer teams in 
international  soccer  competitions.  The  authors  demonstrate  that  this  loss  effect  is  caused  by  a 
change in investor mood.
2 Indeed, soccer results influence investor sentiment but have little direct 
economic impact. Edmans et al. also show that the stock market effect is stronger for countries with 
a  prominent  soccer tradition,  for  games  in the World  Cup and for  elimination  games,  and  for 
smaller stocks.   
English and Scottish professional soccer teams listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
provide  a  unique  way  of  studying  the  stock  price  reaction  to  different  pieces  of  news  while 
controlling  for  the  informational  content.  For  each  of  these  stocks,  betting  markets  and  stock 
markets co-exist and two pieces of information are released on a weekly basis from August to June: 
betting odds and game results. Listed soccer teams are also interesting study objects because the 
performance of the team is greeted with lots of emotion and media coverage. The objective of this 
paper is not to identify a profitable trading strategy, but to analyse the impact of investor sentiment 
and information salience on news absorption by the stock market by studying the difference in the 
market reactions to these two types of news.  
        Soccer betting in the UK occurs via a fixed-odds procedure: the odds are posted several days 
prior to the game and are very rarely altered in response to betting before the event. This fixed-odds 
betting system is different from the pari-mutuel system (as often used in betting on horse races) and 
from the point spread betting system (used for the most popular sports in the US), in which odds 
                                                 
1 Investor sentiment can be broadly defined as “a belief about future cash flows or investment risks that is not 
justified  by  the  facts  at  hand”  (Baker  and  Wurgler,  2007:129).  While  one  approach  to  study  investor 
sentiment uses psychological biases of individual investors to explain investor underreaction or overreaction 
to news (Barberis et al., 1998, and Daniel at al., 1998), another approach develops aggregate measures of 
sentiment in stock markets (Baker and Wurgler, 2006).   
2  The  previous  literature  in  psychology  shows  that  (inter)national  sports  events  can  significantly  affect 
people’s sentiment about their own personal lives and the mood of an entire country (e.g. White, 1989).     3 
 
 
respond to betting volumes and thus represent a consensus in investors’ opinions. Within a fixed-
odds betting system, the odds represent only the bookmakers’ (or their experts’) opinions.
3 Hence, 
investors  are  informed  on  a  weekly  basis  about  the  experts’  beliefs  about  the  game  outcomes 
(through the odds that the bookmakers publish), and the game results. Both these types of news 
provide new information about the performance of the teams/firms. However, they differ in four 
crucial ways. First, betting odds represent experts’ opinions about game outcomes while game 
results represent information about realizations. Second, betting odds offer short-lived information. 
After two trading days, the game outcome is known and the information value contained by the 
betting odds has evaporated. As a consequence, if betting odds do contain valuable information, 
markets must be fast in processing this information. Third, while a victory or a defeat of soccer 
clubs clearly shifts investor mood, betting odds hardly have any impact on sentiment. Finally, these 
two types of information also differ in their level of salience. Betting odds are publicly available but 
are  only  posted on  bookmakers’  websites  and in ‘betting  shops’.  In  contrast,  game  results  are 
virtually omnipresent: they are extensively discussed in all daily newspapers, on the television 
news, and in a variety of sports shows on prime time.  
          Our paper is structured around four questions: (i) Do victories (and losses) trigger significant 
stock price and trading volume increases (decreases)?, (ii) Do the market reactions reflect rational 
expectations or overreaction induced by information salience/investor sentiment?, (iii) Does the 
release  of  betting  information  trigger  stock  price  and  trading  volume  reactions?,  and  (iv)  Can 
betting odds predict stock returns and do investor sentiment or information salience explain the 
differences in the market reactions to the two correlated sets of news? 
Our findings yield a mix of results. Our first question is answered affirmatively: the market 
reacts strongly to game results, generating abnormal trading volumes and abnormal returns in the 
days following the games. Over a three-day period subsequent to the game, we observe an average 
abnormal return of 88 basis points subsequent to a win, of -101 basis points subsequent to a defeat, 
and of -33 basis points following a draw. We also find that the market processes good news faster 
than bad news, a result consistent with the literature (see e.g. Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000; Chan, 
2003). After a victory, a significant positive average abnormal return is observed on the first trading 
day subsequent to the games, but not on the following days. Bad news (i.e., defeats) is processed 
more slowly as we observe significant negative abnormal returns on the first three trading days after 
a game. These results suggest that information about game results is used extensively by investors. 
Since the game results represent ‘hard’ information about future earnings, our study is related to 
those on stock price (under-)reaction to earning announcements (see e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968; 
Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996; Frazzini, 2006). Our paper is 
                                                 
3 See Pope and Peel (1990) for a theoretical model of this system, and Kuypers (2000) and Goddard and 
Asimakopoulos (2004) for empirical studies. Sauer (1998) wrote a review of the betting literature.      4 
 
 
also related to the studies by Renneboog and Van Brabant (2000) and Brown and Hartzell (2001) 
who study the stock price reactions to game outcomes for listed sports clubs.
4  
Our second question asks whether the above market reactions reflect rational expectations or 
overreaction  induced  by  investor  sentiment  or  information  salience.  The  results  yield  nuanced 
answers.  The  rational  expectations  hypothesis  argues  that  there  is  a  clear  and  direct  relation 
between the financial performance as measured by the stock returns, and the team’s performance on 
the field for the following reasons. First, the proceeds from the national TV deals are redistributed 
to  the  teams  according  to  a  performance-based  scheme,  i.e.,  the  end  of  season  ranking  (see 
Falconieri et al. (2004) and Palomino and Sakovics (2004) for details). Second, if a team ends the 
season ranked among the first four of the top league (the Premier League in England), it has the 
right to participate in the lucrative European competition (the UEFA Champions' League) in the 
following season.
5 For teams playing in the First Division (the championship below the Premier 
League), promotion to the Premier League also brings about a significant increase in income from 
television rights.
6 Third, field performance has a direct impact on ticket sales, merchandising and 
sponsorship revenues. Soccer games also reveal information about the players’ quality to investors. 
For all these reasons, game-outcome related information should have an impact on the stock price.
7 
Consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis, we find that the average abnormal returns of 
about 1% (-1%) over the first three days following a win (a loss) is comparable to the average sales 
revenue derived from a given game for a soccer club. The market reactions to game outcomes are 
also not transitory in the short run. Firms without a large institutional owner are not subject to 
stronger market reactions. However, a set of other tests gives more support to the investor sentiment 
explanation.  For instance,  smaller clubs  are  associated  with  stronger  market  reactions to  game 
results.  Furthermore,  investors  react  strongly  to  a  win,  especially  when  the  win  was  strongly 
expected  (and  hence  should  not  create  a  surprise  effect).  Investor  sentiment  thus  causes  an 
asymmetric share price reaction: wins trigger abnormal returns due to a positive sentiment but, 
                                                 
4 The former study investigates whether share prices of soccer clubs listed on the London Stock Exchange are 
influenced by the soccer teams’ weekly sporting performances. They find a positive average abnormal return 
following victories on the first post-game day, and negative average abnormal returns following defeats and 
draws. Renneboog and Van Brabant (2000) also document that investors respond asymmetrically to wins and 
losses, and that playoff games have a larger impact on returns than regular-season games. Brown and Hartzell 
(2001) study the impact of NBA game results on the equity prices of Boston Celtics Limited Partnership and 
confirm that the results of the Celtics' basketball games significantly affect partnership share returns, trading 
volume, and volatility. 
5 For example, for the season 2000-2001, Manchester United receives national television revenues of Euro 
29.3 million and Champions' League participation revenue of Euro 22.2 million. Falconieri et al. (2004) 
provide more data on television revenues in European soccer. 
6 The sport leagues in Europe operate according to a system of promotion and relegation. Teams ending at the 
top of their league are promoted to the league ranked immediately above, while teams ending at the bottom 
are relegated to the league ranking immediately below. 
7 Professional investors have become important investors in soccer clubs in Europe. The Dow Jones Stoxx 
Football Index was introduced in 2002 to track the stock prices of soccer clubs listed on European stock 
exchanges.      5 
 
 
consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis, the market reaction to a loss is weaker the 
higher its ex ante probability. 
Our third question is answered negatively: we cannot find any evidence of a market reaction 
(neither in volume nor in returns) following the release of betting odds. It may be that the odds do 
not  contain  any  new  information  unknown  to  investors  even  though  we  demonstrate  that 
bookmakers’ experts are excellent predictors of the games’ results. Alternatively, the odds can 
contain new information which is not processed by investors or is too costly to trade on. The 
absence of a market reaction may hence be explained by a lack of information salience, or by high 
bid/ask spreads. Our study differs from previous analyses of the reaction to public news events in 
two important ways. First, we analyse the difference in the reaction to two pieces of news, i.e. 
betting odds versus game results that differ in their sentiment and salience levels. Second, one type 
of news (the betting odds) in our study is released with high frequency and is short-lived. After two 
trading days, our betting odds do not contain further information as the game outcomes are known. 
Since betting odds represent opinions about earnings-related information, our study is also related 
to  the  literature  on  (under-)reaction  to  revisions  of  earnings  forecasts  (see  e.g.  Givoly  and 
Lakonishok, 1979; Chan et al., 1996; Womack, 1996; Daniel et al., 1998). Combining analysts’ 
forecasts  and  salience  (media  coverage)  levels,  Bonner  et  al.  (2005)  show  that  the  investors’ 
reactions to revisions of analysts’ forecasts depend on  the  media  coverage  of  these revisions.
8 
However, there are also crucial differences between information released by bookmakers and that 
released by equity-analysts. Bookmakers, whose expected profits are determined by betting odds, 
are  less  subject  to  the  biases  documented  about  these  analysts,  i.e.,  systematic  optimism 
(Easterbrook  and  Nutt,  1999),  conflicts  of  interests  for  analysts  working  for  brokerage  firms 
(Michaely and Womack, 1999), and incentives to herd (see, e.g., Trueman, 1994; Welch, 2000; 
Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000; Clement and Tse, 2004). 
Our  fourth  question  is  whether  betting  odds  can  be  used  to  predict  the  stock  returns 
subsequent to the game outcome, and whether information salience or investor sentiment explains 
the differential market reactions to betting odds and game results. To test the predictive power of 
fixed  odds  on  stock  returns,  we  compute  the  average  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (ACARs) 
conditional on the strength of the experts’ predictions as reflected in the betting odds (strongly 
                                                 
8 In the finance literature, the consequences of imperfect information processing ability have been studied in 
various environments. Barber and Odean (2008) show that individual investors are net buyers of “attention-
grabbing” stocks. Likewise, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) study the consequence of investors’ limited attention 
to the  way  firms release financial information (e.g., pro forma earning  measures versus GAAP earnings 
measures). Hirshleifer et al. (2007) find that the immediate market reaction to earnings surprises is weaker 
when investors are distracted by a greater number of earnings announcements on the same day. In addition, 
Dellavigna and Pollet (2008) show that earnings announcements on Fridays, when investor inattention is 
more likely, generate less immediate market responses than those on other weekdays. Foucault et al. (2003) 
use a costly-information-processing explanation to provide a rationale for the fact that SOES day-traders 
make  profits  against  NASDAQ  dealers.  Regarding  mutual  fund  inflows,  Barber  et  al.  (2005)  show  that 
mutual fund investors are more sensitive to salient fees (such as front-end loads) than to operational expenses.      6 
 
 
expected to win, weakly expected to win, strongly expected to lose). In particular, we observe that 
the 3-day (statistically significant) average abnormal return is 64 basis points subsequent to the 
game outcome when the team was strongly expected to win. This suggests that betting odds contain 
new information to investors (which is in contrast to the rational expectations hypothesis). A naïve 
60-day trading strategy whereby an investor buys a share in a firm that is strongly expected to win 
and sells after 3 months (regardless of the intermediate news) yields on average between 175 and 
245 basis points over and above the expected returns. Remarkable is that significant abnormal 
returns only emerge when teams are strongly expected to win and not when teams are weakly 
expected to win or strongly expected to lose. The asymmetric predictability of betting odds to stock 
returns following wins and losses and the fact that there is still a market reaction when the outcome 
is most anticipated, does not support the information salience hypothesis. These results imply that 
investor sentiment influences news absorption by the stock market, and betting information predicts 
an overreaction in stock prices.   
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the fixed-odd 
betting system. Section 3 discusses the dataset and Section 4 focuses on methodology. Section 5 
presents the results while Section 6 discusses their robustness. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Fixed-Odds Betting System 
 
The  most  prominent  form  of  soccer  betting  in  the  UK  is  the  fixed-odds  system.  In  this 
system,  the  experts  of  the  bookmakers  (i.e.  companies  that  provide  betting  services)  generate 
betting odds for the possible game outcomes (a win, draw, or loss) in the English and Scottish 
leagues a few days before a game. Betting odds reflect the amount of money that bookmakers will 
pay out to bettors on winning bets per unit of a bet. Once the odds are posted, they are fixed over 
time and it is extremely rare that they change prior to the kick-off of the game. In this respect, the 
fixed-odds system is different from other betting systems such as pari-mutuel (as often used in 
betting on horse races) or the point-spread betting (on basketball, ice hockey, or football in the US), 
which reflect and react to the amount of money bet on each possible outcome up to the start of the 
event.
9 
Consider the following example. The odds on a soccer game between Chelsea (the home 
team – on whose field the game is played) versus Bolton (the away team) are 5/7 for a home win, 
14/5 for an away win, and 13/5 for a draw. These odds quote the net total amount of money that 
will be paid out to the bettor, should he make a correct bet, relative to his stake. Odds of 5/7 ("five-
                                                 
9 Avery and Chevalier (1999) study how investor sentiment changes over time through the analysis of the 
price path of betting odds on the point spread of game outcomes in US football betting. Such an analysis is 
not possible for UK soccer betting as here the odds are fixed and hence do not change prior to the game.      7 
 
 
to-seven") for a home win imply that the bettor can make a £5 net profit on a £7 stake of initial 
investment if Chelsea wins the game. Should he win, the bettor always gets his original stake back, 
so the bettor would receive a total of £12 (= £5 +£7) on a £7 stake in case of a home win. Similarly, 
odds of 14/5 for an away win means that the bettor will make £14 net profit on a £5 stake in the less 
likely event of a win by Bolton. Odds of 13/5 for a draw implies that the bettor will make £13 net 
profit on a £5 stake if there is no winner in the game between Chelsea and Bolton.  
The revenues of the bookmakers for their services in the fixed odds-system are also different 
from those in the pari-mutuel system. In the latter system, a bookmaker’s revenue is a percentage of 
the total amount bet. In the fixed-odds system, the bookmaker’s revenue is measured by the so-
called ’over-roundness’ of the book, which represents his potential profit margin. In the above 
example, the amount of the bet required to receive £ 100 for each outcome is calculated as follows: 
Home win: 100/(1+5/7) =  £ 58.3 
Away win: 100/(1+14/5) = £ 26.3 
Draw:         100/(1+13/5) = £ 27.8 
The over-roundness of the book is the amount by which the actual book exceeds 100: over-
round = 58.3+26.3+27.8-100 = £12.4. Thus, if the book is balanced (i.e. the amounts bet on each 
outcome are inversely related to the odds), the bookmaker takes a proportional stake of 58.3, 26.3 
and 27.8 in the three game outcomes, and he receives a total amount of 58.3+26.3+27.8= £112.4. 
Whatever the outcome of the game, the bookmaker will pay out £100 only and keep the remaining 
£12.4.  His  potential  return  is  then  12.4/112.4=11.05%  of  the  total  amount  bet  if  the  book  is 
balanced.  
It is important to note that, although bookmakers aim at a 'balanced book' which yields them 
the above a return, they also face considerable risks. In the more usual case of an imbalanced book, 
the bookmaker may incur a lower (even negative) or higher return than the over-roundness.  
To derive a measure of the predictive power of the betting odds, we proceed as follows. Let 
w, d and l denote a win, draw and loss, respectively; and let xij (j=w, d, l) denote one plus the 
betting odds for a bet on game outcome j for team i. That is, for one unit of money bet, xij units of 
money are awarded to the bettor (including the one unit of money bet) if outcome j is realized for 
team i. Hence, xij
-1 represents a measure of the bookmaker's belief about the probability of outcome 
j for team i. The normalized probabilities to win and to lose (ProbWin and ProbLoss) reflect the 
bookmaker's beliefs. These measures are equivalent to the implied probabilities in the asset pricing 
literature.  
ProbWini








                            (1)   
ProbLossi









                            (2)       8 
 
 
       The denominator in (1) and (2) is one plus the over-roundness. For the betting odds in our 
sample, over-roundness has a mean of 0.122 and a standard deviation of 0.005, which signifies that 
bookmakers have a potential return of 10.9% (0.122 / 1.122 = 0.109) of the invested (bet) amounts. 
We will discuss further how betting odds represent the expectations of game outcomes in Section 
4.1. 
 
3. Data Description  
 
Twenty UK soccer clubs are listed on the LSE: 12 clubs on the official market and 8 clubs on 
the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
10. In addition, the shares of 4 clubs are traded on OFEX
11, 
but we do not include these firms in our sample because trading on OFEX is infrequent, is not 
regulated, and there is no guarantee of liquidity. Of the listed clubs, we do not include Watford and 
Aberdeen as their share price history is too short (due to the fact that their flotations only took place 
in the final season of our study). We also exclude Leicester City and West Bromwich Albion due to 
problems with share price data availability. As a result, our dataset covers 16 British soccer clubs 
listed on the London Stock Exchange.
12 Table I lists our sample clubs, the championship to which 
they participate (English or Scottish), their league (Premier League, First or Second Division) by 
season, their rankings at the end of the season, the market on which they are listed (the official 
market or the AIM), the flotation date, and the average market capitalization for the period 1999-
2002. The most valuable club is Manchester United. 
[Insert Tables I and II about here] 
 
The  daily  closing  share  prices  of  the  soccer  clubs,  their  dividends,  trading  volumes  and 
accounting data as well as the daily returns of the FT All Share index and FTSE All Small index are 
collected  from  Thomson  Financial  Datastream.  The  turnover  and  operating  performance  are 
exhibited in Table II. Strikingly, virtually all clubs incur operating losses with the notable exception 
of Manchester United that generated total sales of GBP 146 million with operating earnings of more 
than GPB 15 million.  
The results of soccer games, including league games and national cup games
13, played by the 
clubs of Table I during the three seasons in the period 1999-2002 were purchased from Mables-
                                                 
10 The AIM is part of the LSE and designed for small and growing companies. The listing requirements of the 
AIM are less strict than those of the official market. Over the previous years, 3 clubs were delisted from the 
AIM: Liverpool at the end of 1995, and Loftus Road (QPR) and Nottingham Forest, both in December 2001. 
Therefore, we do not include these clubs into our sample.  
11 OFEX is an unregulated trading facility in which JP Jenkins Ltd. is the main market maker. The following 
clubs are traded on OFEX: Arsenal, Bradford City, Manchester City and Gillingham. 
12 Celtic is the only Scottish soccer club in our sample. Excluding this firm does not affect our results. 
13 When we drop national cup games (e.g. the FA cup games in England) from our sample, our results remain 
unchanged.     9 
 
 
Tables,  an  internet  soccer  information  provider.  Our  sample  does  not  comprise  all  the  games 
because those played by non-listed teams cannot be taken into account. This is the reason why we 
do not have the same number of games won and games lost in our sample.  
Betting  odds  data  are  obtained  from  Ladbrokes,  the  betting  and  gaming  division  of  the 
Hilton  Group.
14  The  dataset  contains  betting  odds  for  weekend  games  (played  on  Saturday  or 
Sunday, or occasionally on Friday night). These betting data are posted on Ladbrokes' website and 
betting offices throughout the UK on Wednesday night. In order to avoid contamination of event 
windows, we exclude those weekend games that are preceded by a Wednesday game.  
Those national and international games for which no betting odds are reported (which is 
exceptional) in the Ladbrokes database are also excluded. Furthermore, in case two listed clubs play 
against each other, we randomly drop one of the two observations from our sample. The reason is 
that both the odds and the game results of one team have a mirror image in those of the other team. 
After matching the stock returns data with the game results and data on betting odds, and after 
randomly excluding a team in games where both clubs are listed firms, we obtain a final sample of 
916 observations. 
         
       4.  Methodology 
 
4.1. From Betting Odds to Expectations about Game Outcomes. 
 
We use a number of measures, including both continuous variables and dummy variables, to 
capture the bookmakers’ expectations about game outcomes. In addition to using the probabilities 
to win and to lose (ProbWin and ProbLoss) which reflect the experts’ beliefs on the outcome of the 
games (see Section 2), we also use a second measure to capture the experts’ expectations about 
game uncertainty and their impact on stock returns: the probability difference (ProbDiff) of winning 
and losing games. Thus, game uncertainty is reflected by:  
 
   ProbDiffi = ProbWini – ProbLossi                                                    (3) 
 
Note that we indirectly include in this measure the probability of a draw (which is captured 
by both ProbWini and ProbLossi). As will be shown later, stock prices react strongly to wins and 
losses but do not react significantly to draws. The larger the ProbDiff, the more a win is expected 
relative  to  a  loss.  When  ProbDiff  decreases  and  approaches  0,  the  outcome  becomes  more 
uncertain. When ProbDiff is negative, a loss is more likely to occur than a win. Therefore, for 
                                                 
14 As the largest and dominant betting bookmaker in the UK, Ladbrokes had a turnover of GBP 3.81 billion in 
2002.     10 
 
 
games with the most uncertain outcomes, both ProbWin and ProbLoss should equal 33.3% and 
ProbDiff equals 0. 
In order to group the games by type of expectations, four dummy variables are constructed by 
utilizing the above continuous variables on bookmakers’ expectations: ProbWin and ProbDiff. Each 
dummy variable is constructed in two ways: specification [a] is based on ProbWin and specification 
[b] is based on ProbDiff:    
• SEW  (strongly expected to win): SEW[a] is equal to one if ProbWin > 0.45, and zero 
otherwise. We find that for all these games, we also have ProbLoss < 0.28. SEW[b] is equal to one 
if ProbDiff > 0.3, and zero otherwise. 
• WEW (weakly expected to win): WEW[a] is equal to one if ProbWin ∈ [0.35, 0.45], and 
zero otherwise. We find that for all these games, we also have ProbWin > ProbLoss. Hence, a win 
is more likely than a loss. WEW[b] is equal to one if ProbDiff ∈ [0, 0.3], and zero otherwise. 
• WEL (weakly expected to lose):  WEL[a] is equal to one if ProbWin ∈ [0.25, 0.35],  and 
zero otherwise. We find that for all these games, we have ProbLoss > ProbWin. Hence, a loss is 
more likely than a win. WEL[b] is equal to one if ProbDiff  ∈ [-0.3, 0], and zero otherwise. 
• SEL  (strongly  expected  to  lose):  SEL[a]  is  equal  to  one  if  ProbWin  <  0.25,  and  zero 
otherwise. We find that for all these games, we also have ProbLoss > 0.48. SEL[b] is equal to one if 
ProbDiff < –0.3, and zero otherwise. 
These  cut-offs  are  arbitrary  and  have  been  chosen  so  as  to  have  a  sufficient  number  of 
observations in each sub-sample. Our results remain qualitatively similar when varying the cut-offs 
points (see below in Section 6 for the robustness checks).  
 
4.2. Abnormal Return Computation 
 
Denoting Pi,t the closing price of stock i on day t, and Divi,(t-1,t) the dividends paid on stock i 
over the period (t-1,t), the return of this stock on day t is defined as: 
1 ,
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r                         (4) 
The  alternative  way  of  calculating  raw  returns,  ri,t  =  ln  [(Pi,+  Divi,(t-1,t)  )/Pi,t-1],  does  not 
influence the results  of this  paper. To  compute  the  stocks’  abnormal  returns,  we  regress  daily 
returns of each soccer club on the FTSE All Small index over the full sample period (i.e., Jan. 1, 
1999 to Dec. 31, 2002)
15. We opt for this index to control for the size effect on stock returns.
16  
                                                 
15 Since the events of soccer games take place every week in a season, we cannot use pre-event data as 
estimation window. Using the full sample period as estimation window, our approach is similar to Brown and 
Hartzell (2000). An abnormal return is that part of the total return that cannot be explained by the covariance 
between stock returns and market returns.     11 
 
 
As some soccer clubs may suffer from non-synchronous trading, we add three leads and three 
lags  of  market  returns  to  the  market  model  (See  Dimson,  1979).  Thus,  the  market  model  we 
consider is estimated over 1008 daily observations for each of the 16 clubs: 
t i t m i i t i r r , ,
3
3 , ε β α τ τ τ + + = +
+
− = ∑       i = 1, …, 16,  t = 1, …, 1035                              (5)   
where rmτ is the return of FTSE All Small index on day τ. Denoting the OLS estimates of αi  





− = − − =
3
3 , τ τ i t m i it it b r a r AR            i = 1, …, 16,  t = 1, …, 1035                                (6)  
The standard errors of the abnormal returns are estimated using the cross section of abnormal 
returns  in  the  event  period.  This  approach  allows  for  event-induced  increases  in  variance 
(MacLinlay, 1997: 27-28). To increase the efficiency and power of the cross-sectional test and 
allow for return heteroskedasticity, Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) make an adjustment 
to the above test and propose a ‘standardized cross-sectional’ test which incorporates information 
on stock returns variance from both the estimation and the event windows. Even though firms in 
our  sample  come  from  the  same  industry  (i.e.  soccer)  and  hence  are  less  subject  to  return 
heteroskedasticity,  we  also  apply  this  methodology  as  a  robustness  check.  First,  the  abnormal 
returns of a firm are standardized by the estimation-period standard deviation (estimated over the 
full sample period in our case). Second, the test statistic is then obtained by dividing the average 
standardized abnormal return (in the event periods) by its cross-sectional standard errors. In other 
words, this approach gives relatively smaller weights to returns of firms with larger variance, and 
the test is consequently robust even if the returns are drawn from different distributions. The results 
following  from  the  Boehmer  et  al.  method  are  similar  to  the  ones  obtained  from  the  method 
described above. 
Given that there may be multiple games played on the same weekend and that there are some 
periods during the year without weekend games (summer and winter stops), we account for event 
clustering in two ways. First, we test the significance of the ARs using the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, which is distribution-free and robust to event clustering. Second, when conducting t-tests, we 
also control for event clustering by using the standard errors of average abnormal returns for each 
calendar day (see, e.g. Brown and Warner, 1980: 233). 
Given that games are played during the weekend and betting odds are posted on Wednesday 
evening after the market closes, or on Thursday morning, our event window spans a period from 
Thursday (prior to the game) to Wednesday (subsequent to the game). We take the weekend as the 
                                                                                                                                                    
16 The results in this paper do no depend upon the choice of the market index. Using the FT All Share index 
yields similar results.  
17 We also corrected the systematic risk for regression to the mean, but this does not influence the results. 
Alternatively, we adopted a regression approach to measure abnormal returns by adding dummy variables for 
the event days to the market model. Our results do not change.     12 
 
 
event date and refer to Thursday, Friday, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday as day -2, -1, 1, 2 and 
3, respectively. For instance, the abnormal return on day -2 (AR(-2)) is the abnormal return between 
Wednesday’s closing time and Thursday’s closing time as expressed by Equation (6). Similarly, we 
computed the abnormal returns AR(z) with z = -1, 1, 2, 3. The cumulative abnormal return between 
days z and z', (z, z' ∈ {-2,…, 3}, z' > z) is defined as CAR(z,z') = AR(z)+ … +AR(z'). The average 





Our approach to study the news absorption by the stock market is structured as follows. First, 
we examine the price and volume reactions to game outcomes. Second, we investigate whether 
these results can be explained by rational expectations, or investor sentiment. Third, we examine 
the predictive power of betting odds with regard to game outcomes and the market reaction to the 
release of betting information. Finally, we study the predicative power of betting odds to post-game 
stock  returns  and  examine  whether  the  results  can  be  explained  by  investor  sentiment  or 
information salience.     
 
         5.1. Stock Price and Trading Volume Reactions to Game Results 
 
Panel A of Table III exhibits the average cumulative abnormal returns over the three days 
following the soccer matches that are categorized by the game outcomes (wins, draws and losses) 
for the entire sample. We observe that the stock prices are sensitive to the information resulting 
from the game results. A win triggers a positive average abnormal return of 53 basis points on day 1 
(statistically significant at the 1% level), and a positive average abnormal return of 88 basis points 
over  the  first  three  days  (statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level).  A  loss  is  followed  by  a 
significantly  negative  average  return  of  28  basis  points  on  the  first  day  following  a  game 
(significant at the 5% level) and a negative average return of 101 basis points over the first three 
days following a game (significant at the 1% level). The mean abnormal return subsequent to a 
draw is negative but not statistically different from zero. 
An interesting related finding is that the market seems to be faster at processing good news 
than bad news. This finding is in line with Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) and Chan (2003) who also 
conclude that investors react more slowly to bad news. We show that after a win, about 60% of the 
three-day abnormal return is generated on the first day. Conversely, after a loss, only 28% of the 
three-day  abnormal  return  is  generated  on  the  first  day.  However,  measured  over  a  three-day 
window, the market reactions to a victory and a defeat are similar in magnitude (88 versus 101     13 
 
 
basis points, respectively). This is different from the results obtained in Brown and Hartzell (2001) 
who find that for US professional basketball games, the market reaction to a defeat is much stronger 
than to a victory. 
[Insert Table III about here] 
 
The end-of-season matches may be different in nature from the matches earlier in the season. 
The reason is that the financial consequences of a victory, a draw or a defeat are more important for 
teams fighting for promotion to a higher league, or for the right to participate in the European 
championships, or to avoid relegation as the end of the season draws near. To address this issue, we 
split our sample in sub-samples. We consider the games played in March or earlier in the season, 
and those played in April or later. The results are presented in Panels B and C of Table III. We find 
that the results for the August-March sub-sample are similar to those obtained for the entire season 
(Panel A). This implies that the significant market reactions to wins and to losses are not due to 
large abnormal returns triggered by games played late in the season. Panel C shows that results for 
the April-June sub-sample are not dissimilar but are somewhat less significant, which may be due 
to a smaller number of observations.   
In a further subsample analysis, we split the April-June sub-sample into four categories based 
on the teams’ end-of-season rankings. The reason is that the financial consequences of the final 
rankings may differ substantially from category to category, which may be reflected in the share 
price reactions. The four categories are labelled as follows: promotion, relegation, top-teams, and 
other post-March. Promotion games are non-cup
18 games played by teams belonging to the top six 
in the English First or Second League. Relegation games are non-cup games played by teams 
ranked at the fifteenth position or lower in every league. Top games are non-cup games played by 
teams belonging to the top six in the English Premier League or top two in the Scottish Premier 
League as they compete for participation in the European championships. Finally, Other represents 
the other non-cup games which were not included in the above categories, but were also played in 
April, May or June. The results show strong statistically significant average abnormal returns for 
the promotion candidates.
19 For example, a victory triggers a three-day average abnormal return of 
4.11%  (statistically  significant  within  the  5%  level)  while  a  defeat  leads  to  a  negative  price 
correction of 3.05% (statistically significant within the 5% level). The abnormal returns for the 
relegation candidates and the top teams competing for the participation right to European soccer, 
i.e. the UEFA Champions League, are large but lack statistical significance (possibly due to small 
sample sizes).   
                                                 
18 The cup competitions are different from regular league competitions: all the clubs of the Premier League 
and Divisions 1, 2 and 3 can participate in the cup competitions which is a knock-out competition with 
immediate elimination upon defeat. 
19 Tables are available upon request.     14 
 
 
We also test the market reaction to game results by estimating models including the variables 
Win, Loss and GoalDiff. Win (Loss) is a dummy equal to one if the team wins (loses) and zero 
otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference between the number of goals scored and those scored by the 
opposing team in a game. Hence, it does not only indicate whether or not the team won, lost or 
obtained  a  draw,  it  also  captures  the  magnitude  of  the  victory  or  the  defeat.  We  estimate  the 
following regressions: 
  CAR(1,j)  = α0 + α1.Win + α2.Loss + β.ControlVariables + ε  (j =1,2,3)      (7) 
  CAR(1,j) = α0 + α1.GoalDiff + β.ControlVariables + ε     (j =1,2,3)     (8) 
where ControlVariables include the following dummy variables: PostMarch equals one if a game is 
played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM equals one if the club is listed on the AIM 
and zero in case of a listing on the Official Market of the LSE; Home equals one if the game is a 
home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup equals one if the game is a national cup game 
and zero otherwise, two Year dummies, and fifteen Team dummies. The results presented in Table 
IV confirm that there is a strong positive reaction to a victory. In all regressions, GoalDiff and Win 
are significantly positive at the 1% level.
20 In addition, the PostMarch dummy is not significant in 
all regressions, which implies that the significance of our findings is not caused by the effect of a 
limited number of important games played late in the season.  
As a robustness check, we also use White’s (1980) standard errors
21 in the regressions and we 
cluster the standard errors by firm, to account for heteroskedasticity and potential dependence in 
residuals. This does not change our results. We use the ARMA(1,1) model to take into account 
autocorrelation when estimating abnormal returns, and use a bootstrapping method to allow for 
non-normal distribution of residuals of regressions in the paper. Our results remain unchanged (see 
Section 6.3 for details of these robustness checks). 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
 
To  test  investors’  reactions  to  game  results  in  terms  of  trading  volume,  we  proceed  as 
follows. First, we define a measure of abnormal volume (AV) around the event dates
22:  
AV(1, 2)  =  1
   -2) (t   Volume 1) (t   Volume
  2) (t   Volume   1) (t   Volume
−
= + − =
= + =
 
                                                 
20 As British soccer leagues operate a point-based system, the magnitude of a victory or a defeat has little 
influence  on  a  club’s  position  in  league  tables  and  future  cash  flows  (see  Section  5.3  for  details).  It  is 
important  to  note  that  we  also  interacted  GoalDiff  with  Win  and  Loss,  respectively,  and  included  the 
interaction terms in Eq. (7). These interaction terms are not statistically significant (Tables are available upon 
request). This is consistent with our expectation that investors do not value the margins of a victory or a 
defeat. 
21 As White’s (1980) standard errors may be biased downward if the sample size is small, three versions of 
finite sample adjustments were proposed by MacKinnon and White (1985). Using MacKinnon and White’s 
HC3 estimator of standard errors does not change our results. 
22 We also used an alternative measure of abnormal volume, i.e. the changes in the logarithms of volumes. 
Our results remain unchanged.     15 
 
 
The numerator of AV(1,2) is the sum of the trading volumes on Monday and Tuesday. The 
denominator  is  the  sum  of  trading  volumes  on  Thursday  and  Friday.  If  AV(1,2)  is  positive 
(negative), it means that the cumulative trading volume on Monday and Tuesday is larger (smaller) 
than the cumulative trading volume on the preceding Thursday and Friday. However, it is possible 
that abnormal volume only captures a day-of-the-week effect independent of the game results. To 
control for this possibility, we test whether the average AV(1,2) around game dates is equal to the 
average AV(1,2) off season, i.e., in June and July.
23 The mean AV(1,2) around game dates and for 
the off-season period (June-July) are given in Table V, Panel A. Cumulated trading volumes on 
Monday and Tuesday are larger than cumulated trading volumes on Thursday and Friday, both 
around game dates and off-season. A test of the difference in means also shows that the mean 
abnormal  volume  around  game  dates  is  significantly  larger  (at  the  5%  level)  than  the  mean 
abnormal volume for June and July.
24  
Taken together, Tables III to V show that investors react strongly to information contained in 
game results, and that share prices react faster to good news than to bad.  
[Insert Table V about here] 
 
         5.2. Do the Market Reactions to Game Results Reflect Rational Expectations or an 
Overreaction? 
 
The market reaction to the game results may reflect a rational reaction to news about the 
future cash flows of these listed firms or the quality of soccer players in these teams. For example, 
wins (losses) may have a direct economic impact on the club in terms of higher (lower) sales of 
related merchandise and advertising or the allocation of TV rights. As shown above, a win (a loss) 
generates average abnormal returns of about 1% (-1%) over the first three days for a given soccer 
club. As the average market capitalization of our sample firm over the period 1999-2002 is ₤62 
million,  one  percent  of  the  average  market  capitalization  represents  ₤0.6  million.  This  is 
comparable to the average sales revenue derived from a soccer game for a club.
25 Hence the value 
induced by the abnormal returns at the events is not unjustifiable by a change in discounted future 
                                                 
23 Trading volume is available for 504 games (out of 916 games in our sample). We treat observations for 
which AV(1,2) is larger than 20 as outliers and remove them from our sample. We retain 475 AV(1,2) 
observations around games dates. For the AV(1,2) in June and July, we have 333 observations.  
24 Hong and Yu (2007) find that stock market turnover is significantly lower during the summer as market 
participants are on vacation. This should not bias our results as we use a difference-in-difference estimator to 
filter out the seasonality of trading volumes when comparing abnormal volumes during season with off-
season. However, if the reduction of trading volumes in the summer also leads to a weaker day-of-the-week 
effect in volumes due to lack of trading activity, it is still possible that our tests of abnormal volume capture a 
day-of-the-week effect rather than reactions to game results.  
25 As the operating profits of listed soccer clubs are on average negative due to e.g. high fees paid to soccer 
players, we use total sales revenue to proxy for cash flows of a club. The average sales of a soccer club in our 
sample is ₤40 million per year, and a British clubs plays about 40 league matches in a soccer season. Hence, a 
soccer game on average generates about ₤1 million revenue for listed clubs in the UK.     16 
 
 
cash  flows  triggered  by  the  game.  This  simple  calibration  provides  support  for  a  rational 
explanation for the strong market reaction to game results. Furthermore, prior literature suggests 
that there is a positive relation between sports performance and profitability of sporting clubs. 
Brown and Hartzell (2001) document that the operating performance of US professional basketball, 
baseball and (American) football clubs is positively associated with teams’ sports performance. 
Bernile and Lyandres (2008) also show that the profitability (measured as the ROA) of European 
soccer teams is increasing in sports performance. This suggests that soccer game results contain 
value-relevant information.  
An alternative explanation is that soccer results influence stock returns through their impact 
on investor sentiment and/or information salience. For instance, stock markets may overreact to 
losses when soccer games generate a bad mood, especially when media coverage is omnipresent. 
We perform a number of tests to distinguish between the competing explanations for the market 
reaction to game results. First, we investigate whether the market reactions persist over time or are 
transitory. If investors overreact to game results, one would expect that the market reactions to 
game results are transitory and will disappear after a short period. We find that the abnormal returns 
following games tend to persist as the abnormal returns following wins are stronger over a five-day 
window than a two- or three-day window. Also, the fact that the sign of the average abnormal 
returns on day 1 is not reversed in days 2-5 suggests that investor reactions are not transitory. These 
findings either do not support the overreaction explanation, or indicate that the overreaction is not 
reversed in the short run (within a week after the game).
26  
Second, investor sentiment is more likely to influence the price of stocks disproportionately 
held by individual investors rather than that of stocks held by institutional investors (see e.g. Lee, 
Shleifer,  and  Thaler,  1991).  We  collect  ownership  data  for  the  UK  soccer  clubs  from  the 
BvD/Amadeus  database  and  partition  our  sample  of  soccer  clubs  into  two  mutually-exclusive 
groups based on the teams’ ownership structure. The first group consists of seven teams whose 
blockholders (i.e. shareholders with at least a 3% stake) include at least one large institutional 
investor (i.e. mutual funds, investment trusts, financial institutions, etc.). These clubs are Celtic, 
Heart of Midlothian, Leeds United, Manchester United, Millwall, Newcastle United, and Preston 
North  End.  The  second  group  consists  of  nine  teams  without  such  an  institutional  major 
shareholder. So, these teams have either no major blockholder (i.e. Charlton Athletic, Southampton, 
and Sheffield United) or a major non-institutional shareholder (i.e. a firm or an individual) (i.e. 
Aston Villa, Burnden Leisure (Bolton Wanderers), Birmingham City, Chelsea Village, Sunderland, 
and  Tottenham  Hotspur).  The  overreaction  explanation  predicts  that  the  first  type  of  teams 
experiences weaker price reactions to game results as institutional investors tend to be more rational 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that this test is confined to a time frame of a week as soccer matches are played every 
weekend during the league competition. An event window longer than a week is contaminated by the high 
frequency of events.     17 
 
 
than individual ones. However, we find that the second group has weaker market reactions, which 
does not support the overreaction explanation. 
Third,  while  smaller  stocks  receive  less  media  attention,  they  tend  to  be  more  strongly 
influenced by investor mood (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Edmans et al., 2007). This helps us to 
distinguish between the competing explanations for the market reactions to game results. If the 
investor sentiment (information salience) hypothesis prevails, soccer results of smaller clubs should 
trigger stronger (weaker) price reactions. We partition our sample into two subsamples based on 
firm size. The group of small clubs includes eight firms (Bolton Wanderers, Birmingham City, 
Charlton Athletic, Heart of Midlothian, Millwall, Preston North End, Southampton, and Sheffield 
United). We find that the game results of the small clubs generate much stronger market reactions 
than those of large clubs. Following a win, the ACAR(0,3) is 1.2% for small clubs versus 0.6% for 
large clubs. For losses, the corresponding average abnormal returns are –1.3% and –0.6%. This 
result supports the conjecture that the market reaction to game results is driven by investor mood.
27  
Finally, if the market reactions reflect rational expectations on future firm value, investors 
would  price  the  expected  outcome  of  games  before  a  game  is  played.  Therefore,  the  market 
reactions to wins or losses should be weaker, the higher the probability of those outcomes. We 
partition our sample into subsamples based on the ex-ante expectations of games (derived from 
betting odds as explained in Sections 2 and 4.1) and the game outcomes
28, and show the results in 
Table VI. First, we find that the market reaction to a win is stronger the higher the probability of the 
win, which defeats the rational expectations hypothesis. For example, the ACAR(1,3) following a 
win is 1% when the win is strongly expected, whereas it is merely 0.5% when the team is strong 
expected  to  lose.  This  implies  that  investors  overreact  to  a  win,  especially  when  the  win  was 
strongly expected (which should not have created a surprise effect). Second, consistent with our 
rational expectations hypothesis, the market reaction to a loss is weaker the higher its ex ante 
probability.  For  example,  ACAR(1,3)  following  a  loss  is  -1.3.%  when  the  club  was  strongly 
expected to win (SEW), whereas it is merely -0.6% when the loss was strongly expected (SEL). 
Taking all this together, we find that the market reactions to wins cannot be explained by ex-ante 
expectations. This is at odds with the rational expectations explanation that the share price reactions 
to game results reflect the fact that investors update their expectations about future cash flows. In 
contrast, the market reactions to losses are consistent with investors’ expectations. The asymmetric 
reaction  to  wins  and  losses  (relative  to  ex-ante  expectations) does  not  support  the information 
salience explanation as both victories and defeats receive similar media coverage. 
                                                 
27 However, as smaller firms have a higher bid-ask spread, the result could also explained by the low liquidity 
of smaller firms. 
28 An alternative approach is to interact game outcomes (Win and Loss) with the ex-ante expectations of 
games (Probwin) and include the interaction terms in Eq. (7). We obtain similar results using this regression 
approach.     18 
 
 
To conclude, we distinguished between competing explanations (rational expectations versus 
investor sentiment / information salience) for the market reactions to game outcomes. The results 
lead  to  nuanced  conclusions.  Consistent  with  the  rational  expectations  explanation,  sports 
performance is related to the operating performance of soccer clubs, and the value induced by the 
abnormal returns at the events is not unjustifiable by a change in discounted future cash flows 
triggered by the game. The market reactions to game outcomes are also not transitory in the short 
run. Firms with no institutional owners are not associated with stronger market reactions. However, 
smaller clubs experience stronger market reactions to game results. This implies that the market 
reaction may reflect investors’ overreaction to the games induced by a shift in sentiment. When we 
relate the ex ante expectations to the market reaction, we obtain some interesting results: investors 
seem to overreact to a win, especially when the win is strongly expected ex-ante, due to positive 
sentiment.  In  contrast,  when  the  teams  lose,  investors  are  less  influenced  by  mood.  Investors’ 
loyalty to their clubs may lead to fewer share sales in the wake of bad news.
29 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
 
5.3. Stock Price and Trading Volume Reactions to the Release of Betting Odds 
 
Next,  we  examine  whether  the  public  information  released  by  specialists  (namely,  the 
bookmakers’ experts) by means of fixed odds is valuable. In other words, we examine whether 
betting  odds  on  soccer  games  have  some  predictive  power.  Betting  odds  are  translated  into 
probabilities to win or lose as explained in Sections 2 and 4.1. Hence, we estimate the following 
regressions with GoalDiff, Win and Loss as dependent variables for each type of model: 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1ProbWin + βControlVariables + ε                          (9) 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1SEW[a] + α2WEL[a] + α3SEL[a] + βControlVariables + ε         (10) 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1ProbDiff + βControlVariables + ε                      (11) 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1SEW[b] + α2WEL[b] + α3SEL[b] + βControlVariables + ε          (12) 
The models with GoalDiff as the dependent variable are estimated using an ordered probit 
model (where the constant terms are normalized to zero). Those with Win or Loss as dependent 
variables are estimated using binary probit models.  
[Insert Table VII about here] 
                                                 
29 Our results that investors overreact to wins rather than to losses in national soccer games are different from 
those of Edmans et al. (2007), who find a significant market decline after a country’s losses in international 
soccer competitions. A potential explanation for the discrepancy is the different competition format between 
national and international soccer competitions. National league tables, e.g. the Premier League in England, 
are determined by the cumulative performance of a club (in terms of points gained) during a soccer season. 
For example, in British soccer league games, a club gains 3 points for a win, 1 point for a draw, and 0 points 
for a loss. Hence a win may have a larger impact on investor sentiment than a loss due to the inherent 
asymmetry in the point-based competition system. In contrast, in international competitions (e.g. the UEFA 




Both Panels A and B of Table VII show that there is a very strong relation between the game 
results and the betting odds. The clubs with a high (ex ante) probability to win (ProbWin) or a high 
probability difference (ProbDiff), as well as the teams which are strongly expected to win (SEW), 
do indeed win their games (models 1, 2, 4 and 5) and are able to avoid defeats (models 3 and 6). 
Likewise, the teams with betting odds strongly predicting a defeat (SEL) are indeed frequently 
defeated (as reflected by the positive coefficients in models 3 and 6) and rarely win (as indicated by 
the negative coefficients in models 1, 2, 4 and 5). All these results are highly statistically significant 
within the 0.1% level.  
Panel A of Table VII also shows that when the betting odds are less clearly predicting a 
defeat (or a victory) as measured by the variable WEL[a] (weakly expected to lose), there is no 
significant relation between WEL[a] and the game results (GoalDiff, Win, Loss). When we measure 
‘weakly  expected  to  lose’  using  the  somewhat  more  refined  method  of  probability  differences 
(WEL[b]), we find that teams that are weakly expected to lose, do indeed incur more defeats and 
realise fewer victories (Panel B). Still, the magnitude of the parameter coefficients as well as their 
statistical significance are lower than those of teams with betting odds reflecting strong predictions 
of victories or defeats. Thus, a higher degree of uncertainty in the betting odds does indeed reflect 
the higher uncertainty of the team’s performance on the field. We conclude that betting odds are 
very good predictors of the game outcomes. Our results are consistent with the existing literature on 
betting markets (see Sauer (1998) for a review). 
Given  that  (i)  stock  prices  react  strongly  to  game  results  and  (ii)  betting  odds  are  good 
predictors of these results, one would expect that stock prices react to the announcement of betting 
odds if investors are rational and the odds contain new information. The above should be fulfilled 
according to Bayes’ rule. Panel A of Table VIII exhibits the ACARs over the two days prior to the 
game  (Thursday  and  Friday).  Interestingly,  we  find  neither  an  economic  nor  a  statistically 
significant price reaction to the posting of betting odds.  
The  absence  of  a  price  reaction  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  investors  ignore  the 
information contained in odds. It may be the case that investors have heterogeneous interpretations 
of public information. In that case, abnormal trading volumes could be observed (in the absence of 
price movements) if information is processed by investors (see Kandel and Pearson, 1995).  
To capture abnormal trading volumes, we use the following measure:  
AV(-2, -1) =  1
   3) (t   Volume * 2





The numerator of AV(-2,-1) is the sum of the trading volumes on Thursday and Friday. The 
denominator is twice the trading volume on Wednesday. If AV(-2,-1) is positive (negative), the 
average trading volume on Thursday and Friday is larger (smaller) than the trading volume on 
Wednesday. As in the case of the volume reaction to game results, we control for the possibility of     20 
 
 
a day-of-the-week effect by comparing the AV(-2,-1) after the release of the fixed odds, with the 
off-season AV(-2,-1) (i.e., the abnormal volume in June and July). The results are shown in Panel B 
of Table VIII. We do not find any evidence that there is a difference between the average abnormal 
volumes  after  the  release  of  odds  during  the  soccer  season  and  the  average  abnormal  trading 
volume during the off-season. 
[Insert Tables VIII and IX about here] 
 
We test the stock price reactions to betting odds further by regressing CAR(-2,-1) on the 
predictions from the betting odds (SEW, WEL, SEL) and on our standard control variables, and 
exhibit  the  results  in  Table  IX.  We  observe  that  none  of  the  estimated  coefficients  of  these 
expectation dummies is significantly different from zero. This result provides additional evidence 
that investors do not react to betting odds.  
 
5.4. Can Betting Odds Predict Stock Returns? The Impact of Information Salience 
and Investor Mood 
 
There may be several explanations for the lack of a market reaction to the release of the 
betting odds although they are excellent predictors of the game outcomes. The first explanation is 
that betting odds do not contain any new information that has not yet been incorporated into the 
prices. The second explanation is that investors neglect information conveyed by betting odds due 
to low salience levels or high transaction costs. Game results are available on a wider scale and may 
even be even hard to avoid: they are presented in all daily newspapers, in the television and radio 
news, and in various sports TV programs in prime time. Conversely, betting odds are available only 
on bookmakers’ websites, in specialized sports publications, or in betting offices. Hence, some 
public information with low media coverage (salience) may not be picked up by investors. 
To find out which of the two explanations prevails, we investigate whether or not betting 
odds have some predictive power for future stock returns. If the odds do predict returns, it follows 
that the market neglects information contained in odds. Formally, to test the predictive power of 
fixed odds on stock returns, we compute the ACARs conditional on the strength of the experts’ 
predictions as reflected in the betting odds (SEL, WEL, WEW, SEW). Table X provides the results 
for several time horizons. In particular, we observe in Panel A that for teams strongly expected to 
win under specification [a] (i.e., using ProbWin), the three-day average abnormal return is 61.37 
basis points (significantly positive at the 1% level). Using specification [b] (i.e., based on Probdiff), 
the three-day reaction is somewhat larger (64.10 basis points, significantly positive at the 5% level). 
We also examine a naïve trading strategy that extends over 60 trading days: an investor buys a 
share in a firm that is strongly expected to win and sells the share after 3 months regardless of the     21 
 
 
intermediate news on the team’s performance. Panel B of Table X shows that this naïve trading rule 
generates between 175 and 245 basis points (depending on the probability measure Probdiff and 
ProbWin, respectively) on average over and above the expected returns. In contrast to the rational 
expectations hypothesis, these results suggest that betting odds contain unpriced information to 
investors. 
We also test the relation between the prediction of the game results (the betting odds) and the 
market price reaction subsequent to the game by running the following OLS regressions (of which 
the variables are defined above): 
CAR(1,j)  = α0 + α1SEW[i] + α2WEL[i] + α3SEL[i] + βControlVariables + ε,     
(i=a,b,  j=2,3 )                          (15) 
Table XI confirms the results of Table X. Under both specifications [a] and [b], SEW is 
statistically significantly related to the various CARs in the four regressions.  
 [Insert Tables X and XI about here] 
 
One may reach the conclusion that betting odds predict stock returns and that investors 
ignore non-salient information. Still, an alternative explanation is that a trading strategy based on 
betting odds may be unprofitable after taking into account the transaction costs. As discussed in 
Section 3, listed soccer clubs tend to be small firms with low trading liquidity. For example, the 
median bid-ask spread (defined as the difference between the bid and ask prices at the closing time 
divided by the average of the bid and ask prices) of these stocks in our sample period ranges from 
1.6% for the most liquid firm (Manchester United) to 15.4% for the least liquid stock (Sheffield 
United). Hence it is questionable whether investors can take advantage of the information in betting 
odds prior to the games. If investors are not able to exploit the potential trading profits, our results 
do  not  necessarily  support  the  information  salience  hypothesis  which  states  that  investors 
underreact to the less salient information, namely that conveyed by the betting odds. Furthermore, 
given that both victories and defeats receive similar media coverage and odds are good predictors of 
game outcomes, the odds should predict stock returns for both expected-to-win and expected-to-
lose teams. However, we find that odds only predict the stock returns well for strongly-expected-to-
win games. Therefore, information salience is here a less credible explanation for our results as 
there is no reason why the information salience hypothesis would be asymmetric (be valid for 
losses but not for wins).  
As investors’ reactions to soccer results could be driven by mood (Edmans et al., 2007), we 
investigate whether this sentiment can explain the predictive power of fixed odds for stock returns 
before transaction costs. As shown in Section 5.2, investors’ reaction to a win, in contrast to the 
market reaction to a loss, is not consistent with the expectations about the games’ outcomes. In 
particular, investors overreact to wins which are ex ante strongly expected to occur and which 
should not have triggered a strong surprise effect. This is in line with our finding: if teams are     22 
 
 
strongly expected to win, fixed odds predict post-game abnormal returns, while this is not the case 
if teams are strongly expected to lose. Hence, we believe that the main explanation for the results 
presented in this section is related to investor sentiment.  
 
6. Robustness of the Findings  
 
6.1. Construction of the Prediction Variables from Betting Odds 
          We  also  investigate  whether  our  results  depend  on  the  way  we  construct  the  prediction 
variables SEW, SEL, WEW, and WEL. We find that this is not the case. As already mentioned in 
Section  4.1,  our  results  remain  qualitatively  equivalent  when  we  choose  other  thresholds  for 
ProbWin  and  ProbDiff  to  define  the  dummy  variables  SEW,  SEL,  WEW,  and  WEL.  For 
Specification [a], the alternative sets of thresholds we tested, are: {0.2, 0.3, 0.4} and {0.3, 0.4, 0.5}. 
For Specification [b], our alternatives ({-0.2, 0, 0.2}, {-0.25, 0, 0.25} and {-0.4, 0, 0.4}) also yield 
results similar to the ones presented above.  
 
6.2. Liquidity of stocks and timing of games 
 
We also verify whether our results are driven by a few small firms with low liquidity in the 
trading  of  their  shares.  In  all  regressions,  we  control  for  team-specific  effects  by  using  team 
dummies. In addition, if we drop the smaller clubs from our sample, our main results still hold. 
Furthermore, game outcomes may become more important to investors near the end of the 
season when the competition becomes more exciting. We control for this by using a PostMarch 
dummy in all regressions. Our results remain unchanged when using post-February or post-April 
games as end-of-season games. 
 
           6.3. Econometric Issues (ARMA models, bootstrapping, clustered standard errors) 
 
            First, given the low liquidity of some of the stocks in this study, the closing price may 
bounce between the bid and ask prices. This may generate a negative autocorrelation in returns and 
bias our statistical inference. However, this effect does not affect our results. After adjusting for 
autocorrelation in stock returns, our results (both the coefficients and the significance levels) are 
unchanged.  More  specifically,  following  Brown  and  Hartzell’s  (2001:  366)  methodology  (i.e., 
verifying the autocorrelation by means of an AR(1) model and a MA(1) model), we check the 
autocorrelations  by  using  the  residuals  from  an  ARMA(1,1)  model  as  abnormal  returns.  The 
ARMA(1,1) model we consider is: 
1 , , 1 , ,
3
3 , − − +
+
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where  t i, ε  is the abnormal returns,  1 , − t i r λ  represents the autoregressive process (AR) in raw returns, 
and  1 , − t i ηε  represents the moving average process (MA) in residuals. Thus, under the assumption 
that stock returns follow a ARMA(1,1) process, the abnormal returns ( t i, ε ) follow a random walk. 
We rerun all the regressions discussed in this paper using the residuals from the ARMA(1,1) model 
as abnormal returns. The results remain largely unchanged and are available upon request.   
Second, as we have only performed OLS regressions, one may argue that if the residuals of 
regressions are not normally distributed, the statistical inference from the t-test may be biased. We 
use a bootstrap method to obtain the empirical distribution of the estimated coefficients of the OLS 
regressions. The procedure has three main steps. First, we resample data by randomly drawing  
(with replacement) the residuals of OLS regressions from our sample. For one completed draw of 
regression residuals, we calculate the bootstrapped values of the dependant variables. Second, once 
the bootstrapped data has been created, we run regressions on the resampled data to estimate the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. Third, we repeat the above steps 150 times to generate a 
distribution of the estimates.
30 From this distribution we compute the empirical p-values of the 
estimated coefficients in the regressions. Our main results remain unchanged.  
Third,  we  also  control  for  heteroskedasticity  and  potential  dependence  in  residuals  of 
regressions. In particular, using White standard errors in the regressions or employing clustered 
standards errors by firm does not change our results. 
 
7. Conclusions   
 
We started off asking the question whether or not the stock market incorporates the news of 
victories, defeats and draws of listed British soccer clubs. The average cumulative abnormal returns 
over a three day period are strongly statistically significant and amount to 88 basis points for a 
victory, -101 basis points for a defeat, and -33 basis points for a draw. We also find that markets are 
very  fast  in  processing  good  news  about  game  outcomes  (most  of  the  impact  of  a  victory  is 
incorporated in the share prices during the first trading day) and somewhat slower in incorporating 
bad news (defeats). On the first trading day following a game, we observe significant share volume 
increases.  
A second question emerges as to whether these market reactions reflect rational expectations 
(as  the  previous  literature  shows  a  relation  between  game  outcomes  and  future  operating 
performance)  or  the  abnormal  returns  can  be  explained  by  investor  sentiment  or  information 
salience. While the weekly value changes represented by the abnormal returns are not unjustifiable 
by  the  potential  change  in  discounted  cash  flows,  we  find  evidence  of  investor  overreaction 
                                                 
30 When we increase the size of simulations to 1000 samples, the significance levels of estimated coefficients 
do not change.     24 
 
 
following  the  game  outcomes.  We  apply  several tests  to  study  investor  mood  and  information 
salience: Are the abnormal returns transitory? Are smaller firms and firms with no institutional 
owners more prone to overreaction? Are the market reactions to wins or losses weaker, the higher 
the ex ante probability of those outcomes? Our most convincing test gives evidence that investors 
overreact to a win, especially when the win was strongly expected and hence should not have 
created a surprise effect. Investor sentiment also causes an asymmetric share price reaction: wins 
trigger abnormal returns due to a positive sentiment, but, consistent with the rational expectations 
hypothesis, the market reaction to a loss is weaker the higher its ex ante probability. Investors’ 
loyalty to their clubs may lead to fewer share sales in the wake of bad news. 
Our  third  question  is  about  how  the  market  receives  the  experts’  opinions  about  the 
probability of the game outcomes. These opinions are embedded in the betting information (fixed 
odds) which is released some days prior to the games. We do not find any significant reaction 
(neither in share prices nor in trading volumes) to the release of betting odds by bookmakers. This 
is particularly interesting as we show that the betting odds are excellent predictors of the game 
outcomes. It is now widely acknowledged that individuals have limited information processing 
abilities. One of the consequences is that the way information is processed may depend on its 
relative salience, i.e., the media coverage it receives. Professional soccer clubs listed on the London 
Stock Exchange provide a unique way of studying stock price reactions to different types of news 
since two pieces of news are released on a weekly basis from August to June: betting odds which 
incorporate information about the expected future performance, and game results which capture 
information about the realized performance. Furthermore, these two types of information differ in 
their level of salience: game results receive very high media coverage (in all daily newspapers, in 
the television news, and in sports shows on prime time), while betting odds are only posted on 
bookmakers’ websites, in specialized sports magazines and in betting shops. In contrast to the 
significant volume and share price reaction subsequent to the game results, there is none subsequent 
to the release of the betting odds. This may be due to the fact that the latter information is not 
salient. Still, some caution is needed with this interpretation as it may be that the odds do not 
contain any new information that has not yet been incorporated into stock prices. Also, the bid-ask 
spreads of the listed soccer clubs (which are mostly small caps) are high such that developing a 
profitable trading strategy may be difficult.  
Due to the absence of a market reaction to the disclosure of betting odds, we ask our fourth 
question:  can  betting  odds  be  used  to  predict  short-run  market  returns?  Formally,  to  test  the 
predictive power of fixed odds on stock returns, we compute the ACARs conditional on the strength 
of  the  experts’  predictions  as  reflected  in  the  betting  odds  (strongly  expected  to  win,  weakly 
expected to win, weakly expected to lose, strongly expected to lose). In particular, we observe that 
the 3-day (statistically significant) average abnormal return is 64 basis points subsequent to the 
game outcome when the team was strongly expected to win. This suggests that betting odds contain     25 
 
 
new information to investors (which does not support the rational expectations hypothesis). A naïve 
60-day trading strategy whereby an investor buys a share in a firm that is strongly expected to win 
and sells after 3 months (regardless of the intermediate news) yields on average between 175 and 
245 basis points over and above the expected returns. However, the potential trading profits largely 
disappear when transaction costs are taken into account. Remarkable is that significant abnormal 
returns only emerge when teams are strongly expected to win and not when teams are weakly 
expected to win or strongly expected to lose. The asymmetric predictability of betting odds to stock 
returns following wins and losses and the fact that there is still a market reaction when the outcome 
is most anticipated, does not support the information salience hypothesis but leads to our conclusion 
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Soccer clubs and sporting performance 
 
    This table presents the soccer clubs included in our sample and gives their positions in their leagues for the 
seasons 1999-2000 to 2001-2002. LSE represents a listing on the London Stock Exchange. AIM stands for 
the Alternative Investment Market (a segment of LSE). MV is the average market value for the period 1999- 
2002, in GBP million. EP (SP) stands for English (Scottish) Premier League. E1 (E2) stands for English First 
(Second) Division. The numbers next to their league are the rankings at the end of the seasons in 2000, 2001 
and 2002.  
 
Club  List Date  Exchange  MV  League & Position 
      (₤ million)  1999-00  2000-01  2001-02 
Aston Villa  April 1997  LSE  36.5  EP  6  EP  8  EP  8 
Burnden Leisure 
(Bolton Wanderers)  April 1997  AIM  13.1  E1  6  E1  3  EP  16 
Birmingham City  March 1997  AIM  17.3  E1  5  E1  5  E1  5 
Chelsea Village  March 1996  AIM  76.2  EP  5  EP  6  EP  6 
Celtic  Sept. 1995  LSE  50.1  SP  2  SP  1  SP  1 
Charlton Athletic  March 1997  AIM  16.9  E1  1  EP  9  EP  14 
Heart of Midlothian  May 1997  LSE  9.1  SP  3  SP  5  SP  6 
Leeds United  Aug. 1996  LSE  48.6  EP  3  EP  4  EP  5 
Manchester United  June 1991  LSE  516.9  EP  1  EP  1  EP  3 
Millwall  Jan. 1989  LSE  16.8  E2  5  E2  1  E1  4 
Newcastle United  April 1997  LSE  70.4  EP  11  EP  11  EP  4 
Preston North End  Jan. 1995  AIM  6.8  E2  1  E1  4  E1  8 
Southampton  Jan. 1997  LSE  12.3  EP  15  EP  10  EP  11 
Sunderland  Dec. 1996  LSE  33.7  EP  7  EP  7  EP  17 
Sheffield United  Dec. 1996  LSE  5.8  E1  16  E1  10  E1  13 




Operating performance of listed soccer clubs 
 
This  table  presents  the  total  sales  and  operating  profits  (in  ₤  million)  of  the  listed  soccer  clubs.  The 
percentages of total sales derived from soccer related activities are reported for 2002. The summary statistics 
are calculated across firms. Source: Datastream. 
 
Club  Total Sales  Operating Profit 
  2000  2001  2002  2000  2001  2002 
Aston Villa  35.8  39.4  46.7  100%  -5.2  -6.9  -9.9 
Burnden Leisure (Bolton Wanderers)  13.4  14.5  36.8  83%  -8.6  -12.8  0.8 
Birmingham City  9.4  13.3  15.2  100%  -3.9  -2.6  -6.1 
Chelsea Village  106.8  93.6  115.3  64%  2.1  -6.8  -7.7 
Celtic  38.6  42.0  56.9  82%  -5.1  -9.4  -2 
Charlton Athletic  11.7  28.3  30.6  100%  -6.7  -0.2  -12.8 
Heart of Midlothian  7.1  7.9  6.1  100%  -3.3  -3.7  -3.5 
Leeds United  57.1  86.3  81.5  100%  -2.9  -5.7  -28.5 
Manchester United  116.0  129.6  146.1  100%  15.5  19.3  15.2 
Millwall  4.8  4.8  10.6  100%  -2.6  -2.6  -0.1 
Newcastle United  45.1  54.9  70.9  100%  -19.3  -5.2  0.0 
Preston North End  5.7  7.2  9.9  100%  -1.5  -0.8  0.2 
Southampton  20.8  29.1  38.5  81%  -3.4  -2.3  -1.6 
Sunderland  37.3  46.0  43.8  100%  -6.9  1.6  -7.8 
Sheffield United  5.8  6.5  10.0  97%  -5.0  -3.6  -2.4 
Tottenham Hotspur  48.0  48.4  65.0  100%  -4.2  -1.7  -4.8 
               
Mean  35.2  40.7  49.0  94%  -3.8  -2.7  -4.4 
St. Dev  34.4  36.0  39.8  11%  6.8  6.9  8.9 
Median  28.3  34.3  41.2  100%  -4.1  -3.1  -3.0 




Market reactions to game results 
 
This table presents the average (cumulative) abnormal returns (A(C)ARs) in basis points subsequent to the 
soccer games. Panel B and Panel C show the A(C)ARs for the sub-samples of the August-March games and 
the April-June ones, respectively. The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test are presented in the first and second rows following the A(C)ARs, respectively. 
  
   N  Reaction to games 
      AAR(1)  ACAR(1,2)  ACAR(1,3) 
Panel A:  All games       
Win  405  52.72  63.45  88.26 
p-value of t-test   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
Draw  233  -8.15  -25.01  -32.54 
p-value of t-test    (0.652)  (0.367)  (0.281) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.337)  (0.457)  (0.727) 
         
Loss  278  -27.95  -57.02  -100.81 
p-value of t-test    (0.011)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.095)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Panel B:  Games in August-March    
Win  329  51.46  65.16  81.09 
p-value of t-test   (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
Draw  187  -0.64  -9.82  -17.72 
p-value of t-test    (0.974)  (0.748)  (0.591) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.436)  (0.497)  (0.799) 
         
Loss  222  -21.10  -54.22  -102.66 
p-value of t-test    (0.063)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.163)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Panel C:  Games in April-June     
Win  76  58.17  56.02  119.30 
p-value of t-test    (0.051)  (0.186)  (0.041) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.222)  (0.175)  (0.047) 
         
Draw  46  -38.68  -86.78  -92.80 
p-value of t-test    (0.381)  (0.187)  (0.211) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.544)  (0.714)  (0.789) 
         
Loss  56  -55.10  -68.11  -93.48 
p-value of t-test    (0.081)  (0.052)  (0.031) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.344)  (0.154)  (0.370) 




Market reactions to game results: regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results explaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following 
the soccer games. The dependent variables are the announcement abnormal return and the CAR(1,2) and 
CAR(1,3). Win (Loss) is a dummy equal to one if the team wins (loses) and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the 
difference between the number of goals scored and those conceded in a game. PostMarch is equal to one if a 
game is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is listed on the 
AIM and zero otherwise; Home is equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; 
Cup is equal to one if the game is a national cup game and zero otherwise. The p-values of the estimated 
coefficients are in parentheses. All regressions have 916 observations.
 ***, 
**, 
* stand for statistical significance 




Variable :  AR(1)  AR(1)  CAR(1,2)  CAR(1,2)  CAR(1,3)  CAR(1,3) 
             
Constant  23.40  4.46  -7.35  -22.50  -42.12  -45.87 
  (0.924)  (0.986)  (0.983)  (0.948)  (0.921)  (0.914) 
GoalDiff       18.91
***         26.22
***         37.85
***   
  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
Win        58.94
***       83.16
***      119.39
*** 
    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.001) 
Loss    -19.20    -35.08    -65.02
* 
    (0.388)    (0.254)    (0.087) 
PostMarch  -16.28  -16.98  -29.21  -29.89  -1.40  -1.99 
  (0.432)  (0.412)  (0.309)  (0.297)  (0.969)  (0.955) 
AIM  -29.06  -29.03  -53.35  -60.95  -63.13  -85.35 
  (0.907)  (0.907)  (0.876)  (0.859)  (0.882)  (0.840) 
Home  -5.77  -4.28  0.77  0.95  34.98  32.62 
  (0.730)  (0.797)  (0.974)  (0.967)  (0.224)  (0.252) 
Cup  -18.06  -18.54  6.19  5.87  -5.39  -5.12 
  (0.536)  (0.526)  (0.878)  (0.885)  (0.914)  (0.918) 
Year9900  20.18  19.02  59.03
**    56.63
**    82.84
**    78.27
** 
  (0.321)  (0.350)  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.018)  (0.025) 
Year0001  27.79  26.11  57.37
**  54.56
*   79.65
**   75.00
** 
  (0.174)  (0.202)  (0.043)  (0.054)  (0.023)  (0.032) 
Team 
Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
R
2  0.044  0.045  0.045  0.049  0.050  0.060 
F-Statistics       1.85
***      1.83
***     1.91
***      2.00
***       2.15
***        2.46
*** 











Trading volume reactions to game results 
 
Panel A of this table presents the average abnormal volumes (AAVs) in percentage subsequent to the soccer 
games. The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are presented in the first 
and second rows following the AAVs, respectively. Panel B presents the OLS regression results explaining 
the abnormal volumes following soccer games. The dependent variables are AV(1,2). Win (Loss) is a dummy 
equal to one if the team wins (loses) and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference between the number of 
goals scored and those conceded in a game. PostMarch is equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or 
June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is 
equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is 
a national cup game and zero otherwise. The p-values of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. All 
regressions have 475 observations. 
***, 
**, 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Average Trading volume reactions 
  N  Reaction to games  N  June-July  Difference 
           
AAV(1,2)  475  121.21%  333  89.4%  31.81% 
p-value of t-test    (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.025) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.013) 
 
Panel B: Regression results 
Dep. Variable :  AV(1,2)  AV(1,2) 
     
Constant  21.08  14.38 
  (0.944)  (0.962) 
GoalDiff  12.82   
  (0.116)   
Win    21.40 
    (0.538) 
Loss    -23.50 
    (0.539) 
PostMarch  10.12  9.91 
  (0.744)  (0.749) 
AIM  169.11  176.86 
  (0.598)  (0.583) 
Home  15.62  19.37 




  (0.075)  (0.067) 
Year9900  -8.56  -7.75 
  (0.820)  (0.838) 
Year0001  15.09  15.08 
  (0.696)  (0.698) 
Team Dummies  Yes  Yes 
     
R




Prob > F  0.018  0.032 
 





Market reactions to game results conditional on ex ante expectations 
 
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal returns (ACARs) in basis points subsequent to wins, 
draws and losses, categorized on the basis of the betting odds. We define 4 dummy variables which indicate 
whether a team was strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to 
lose (WEL,) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). We label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) 
in Panel A and by [b] (when Probdiff  is used) in Panel B. The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test are presented in the first and second rows underneath the ACARs, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A  Specification [a]         
    SEW[a]  WEW[a]  WEL[a]  SEL[a] 
Win  ACAR(1,3)  104.6  83.44  50.52  49.46 
  p-value of t-test  (0.000)  (0.081)  (0.312)  (0.546) 
  p-value Wilcoxon  (0.000)  (0.069)  (0.091)  (0.065) 
  Number of observations  232  84  63  26 
           
Draw  ACAR(1,3)  37.79  -129.83  -59.14  41.34 
  p-value of t-test  (0.314)  (0.043)  (0.422)  (0.604) 
  p-value Wilcoxon  (0.185)  (0.138)  (0.396)  (0.627) 
  Number of observations  82  66  56  29 
           
Loss  ACAR(1,3)  -126.92  -120.83  -117.77  -59.05 
  p-value of t-test  (0.025)  (0.010)  (0.033)  (0.030) 
  p-value Wilcoxon  (0.054)  (0.089)  (0.081)  (0.098) 
  Number of observations  43  77  67  91 
           
           
Panel B  Specification [b]         
     SEW[b]  WEW[b]  WEL[b]  SEL[b] 
Win  ACAR(1,3)  102.3  89.48  64.49  29.96 
  p-value of t-test  (0.002)  (0.023)  (0.133)  (0.834) 
  p-value Wilcoxon  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.022)  (0.256) 
  Number of observations  185  126  79  15 
           
Draw  ACAR(1,3)  44.47  -83.64  -68.87  90.29 
  p-value of t-test  (0.409)  (0.092)  (0.265)  (0.306) 
  p-value Wilcoxon  (0.504)  (0.470)  (0.690)  (0.322) 
  Number of observations  56  83  73  21 
           
Loss  ACAR(1,3)  -134.8  -124.25  -113.56  -49.82 
  p-value of t-test  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.091) 
  p-value Wilcoxon  (0.040)  (0.090)  (0.087)  (0.261) 
  Number of observations  30  80  89  79 




Table VII  
Quality of odds 
 
This table presents the estimation results of regressions testing the predictive power of betting odds. Win 
(Loss) is a dummy equal to one if the team  wins (loses) and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference 
between the number of goals scored and those conceded in a game. The probabilities to win and to lose (in %) 
are  represented  by  ProbWin  and  ProbLoss.  The  probability  difference  of  winning  and  losing  games  is 
captured by ProbDiff. We define 4 dummy variables which indicate whether a team is strongly expected to 
win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose 
(SEL). Depending on the probability measure used, we label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is 
used) and by [b]  (when ProbDiff. is used). PostMarch is equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or 
June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is 
equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is 
a national cup game and zero otherwise. Ordered probit regressions are used when the dependent variable is 
GoalDiff,  and  probit  regressions  when  Win  and  Loss  are  the  dependent  variables.  The  p-values  of  the 
estimated coefficients are in parentheses. All regressions have 916 observations.
 ***, 
**, 
* stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Quality of odds [a]              Model 1   Model 2  Model 3 
  Ordered probit  Probit  Probit 
Dependent Var.:  GoalDiff   Win  Loss 
Panel A:             
Constant                    -8.03
***    -6.90
***       8.43
***     6.99
***   
        (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)   
ProbWin      0.04
***          0.04
***      -0.04
***     
  (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)     
SEW[a]        0.58
***         0.66
***          -0.82
***   
    (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)   
WEL[a]    -0.13      -0.05      0.09   
    (0.226)      (0.727)      (0.507)   
SEL[a]        -0.75
***       -0.52
***         0.78
***   
    (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.000)   
PostMarch  -0.09  -0.08    -0.08  -0.08    0.06  0.06   
  (0.303)  (0.335)    (0.457)  (0.488)    (0.627)  (0.643)   
AIM  1.82
*  1.85
*         6.37
***      6.47
***         -7.07
***        -7.17
***   
  (0.077)  (0.073)    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)   
Home  -0.12  0.04    -0.11  0.04    0.14  0.02   
  (0.189)  (0.669)    (0.334)  (0.726)    (0.227)  (0.892)   
Cup  -0.15  -0.02    -0.06  0.06    0.34  0.25   
  (0.216)  (0.861)    (0.728)  (0.712)    (0.062)  (0.146)   
Year9900  0.08  0.07    0.11  0.11    -0.16  -0.15   
  (0.368)  (0.390)    (0.319)  (0.333)    (0.187)  (0.207)   
Year0001  0.04  0.05    0.13  0.13    -0.04  -0.04   
  (0.641)  (0.593)    (0.263)  (0.249)    (0.754)  (0.753)   
Team Dummies  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes   
                   
Pseudo R
2  0.068  0.059    0.126  0.111    0.158  0.146   
 
 




Table VII – Continued 
 
 
Quality of odds [b]                   Model  4  Model 5       Model 6 
  Ordered probit  Probit  Probit 
Dependent Var.:  GoalDiff  Win   Loss 
Panel B:     
Constant        -6.73
***  -6.82
***    6.83
***  6.92
***   
        (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)   
ProbDiff  0.02
***      0.02
***      -0.02
***     
  (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)     
SEW[b]    0.53
***      0.60
***      -0.71
***   
    (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)   
WEL[b]    -0.32
***      -0.26
**      0.32
**   
    (0.001)      (0.035)      (0.011)   
SEL[b]    -1.01
***      -0.90
***      1.17
***   
    (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000)   
PostMarch  -0.08  -0.07    -0.08  -0.06    0.05  0.03   
  (0.338)  (0.447)    (0.486)  (0.590)    (0.663)  (0.795)   
AIM  1.81
*  1.92
*    6.36
***  6.53
***    -7.05
***  -7.23
***   
  (0.079)  (0.063)    (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)   
Home  -0.11  0.02    -0.10  0.01    0.13  0.01   
  (0.229)  (0.791)    (0.389)  (0.903)    (0.270)  (0.916)   
Cup  -0.13  -0.03    -0.03  0.06    0.32  0.24   
  (0.300)  (0.831)    (0.834)  (0.728)    (0.071)  (0.161)   
Year9900  0.08  0.10    0.11  0.13    -0.16  -0.19   
  (0.352)  (0.261)    (0.307)  (0.250)    (0.168)  (0.112)   
Year0001  0.04  0.07    0.13  0.15    -0.04  -0.07   
  (0.624)  (0.403)    (0.251)  (0.175)    (0.722)  (0.538)   
Team Dummies  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes   
                   
Pseudo R









Market reactions to odds 
 
This table presents the (cumulative) average abnormal returns ((C)AARs) in basis points (in Panel A) and the 
average abnormal volumes (AAVs) in percentage (in Panel B) after the betting odds are posted. We define 4 
dummy variables which indicate whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win 
(WEW), weakly expected to lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on the probability 
measure used, we label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when Probdiff. is 
used). The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are presented in the first 
and second rows following the average abnormal returns (volumes). The p-value  of the Wilcoxon rank-sum 




Panel A: Stock price reactions to betting odds 
   N  Reaction to odds [a]  N  Reaction to odds [b] 
      AAR(-2)  AAR(-1)  ACAR(-2,-1)     AAR(-2)  AAR(-1)  ACAR(-2,-1) 
                 
SEW  357  5.96  -6.42  -0.47  271  11.38  -6.28  5.09 
p-value of t-test    (0.568)  (0.530)  (0.974)    (0.380)  (0.601)  (0.775) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.635)  (0.666)  (0.849)    (0.973)  (0.903)  (0.877) 
                 
WEW  227  -15.91  8.10  -7.82  289  -15.51  2.18  -13.33 
p-value of t-test    (0.218)  (0.522)  (0.650)    (0.157)  (0.849)  (0.368) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.222)  (0.221)  (0.679)    (0.123)  (0.277)  (0.587) 
                 
WEL  186  10.71  -12.02  -1.31  241  8.65  -11.40  -2.75 
p-value of t-test    (0.459)  (0.345)  (0.951)    (0.463)  (0.275)  (0.871) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.166)  (0.077)  (0.740)    (0.131)  (0.106)  (0.597) 
                 
SEL  146  -18.85  14.84  -4.01  115  -25.50  28.66  3.16 
p-value of t-test    (0.287)  (0.478)  (0.888)    (0.227)  (0.265)  (0.929) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.517)  (0.609)  (0.468)     (0.832)  (0.258)  (0.426) 
 
Panel B: Trading volume reactions to betting odds 
  N  Reaction to odds  N  June-July  Difference 
           
AAV(-2,-1)  475  139.08%  324  128.91%  10.17% 
p-value of t-test    (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.540) 








Market reactions to odds: regression results 
 
This  table  presents  the  OLS  regression  results  explaining  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs) 
immediately after the betting odds are posted. The dependent variables are the CAR(-2,-1). We define 4 
dummy variables which indicate whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win 
(WEW), weakly expected to lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on the probability 
measure used to define the above categorization, we label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) 
and by [b] (when ProbDiff. is used). PostMarch is equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or June, 
and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is equal to 
one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is a 
national cup game and zero otherwise. The p-values of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. All 
regressions have 916 observations. 
 
 
     Specification [a]  Specification [b] 
         CAR(-2,-1)  CAR(-2,-1) 
        
Constant  -14.26    -26.21   
  (0.960)    (0.927)   
SEW  19.42    33.16   
  (0.481)    (0.230)   
WEL  6.14    6.47   
  (0.835)    (0.810)   
SEL  -1.99    6.96   
  (0.951)    (0.840)   
PostMarch  14.04    14.50   
  (0.561)    (0.549)   
AIM  18.54    28.11   
  (0.949)    (0.922)   
Home  6.39    4.08   
  (0.792)    (0.868)   
Cup  -63.78
*    -66.50
*   
  (0.063)    (0.053)   
Year9900  -11.55    -11.02   
  (0.629)    (0.643)   
Year0001  -29.43    -29.43   
  (0.220)    (0.218)   
Team Dummies  Yes    Yes   
         
R
2  0.036    0.034   
F-Statistics  0.99    1.02   













Predictability of betting odds 
 
This table presents the (cumulative) average abnormal returns ((C)AARs) in basis points subsequent to the 
soccer games, categorized on the basis of the betting odds. We define 4 dummy variables which indicate 
whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to lose 
(WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on the probability measure used, we label the above 
variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when Probdiff. is used). The p-values (in parentheses) of 
the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are presented in the first and second rows, respectively, following 
the ACARs. In Panel B, the p-values of the t-test are computed using Newey-West standard errors of the 
time-series of average CARs to account for serial correlation. The naïve trading rule of Panel B works as 
follows. Every week, an investor buys a share in firms strongly (weakly) expected to win or to lose. The 
investor adopts this naïve buy-and-hold strategy for 3 months when he takes the opposite position; he does 
not take into account intermediate news to change his position. Every week, he repeats this strategy. 
 
Panel A: Short-run predictability 
     Specification [a]    Specification [b] 
    N    ACAR(1,2)  ACAR(1,3)   N    ACAR(1,2)  ACAR(1,3) 
SEW  357    43.81  61.37  271    50.02  64.10 
p-value of t-test      (0.010)  (0.005)      (0.020)  (0.013) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.010)  (0.005)      (0.031)  (0.040) 
                 
WEW  227    -29.76  -47.86  289    -15.86  -19.40 
p-value of t-test      (0.188)  (0.115)      (0.380)  (0.459) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.724)  (0.474)      (0.682)  (0.618) 
                 
WEL  186    -25.74  -43.12  241    -24.12  -41.65 
p-value of t-test      (0.381)  (0.207)      (0.326)  (0.144) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.697)  (0.621)      (0.779)  (0.680) 
                 
SEL  146    -0.56  -19.79  115    7.46  -13.83 
p-value of t-test      (0.982)  (0.466)      (0.798)  (0.659) 
p-value Wilcoxon       (0.918)  (0.700)       (0.865)  (0.659) 
 
Panel B: A naive long-run trading rule 
     Specification [a]    Specification [b] 
    N    ACAR(1,10)  ACAR(1,60)   N    ACAR(1,10)  ACAR(1,60) 
SEW  357    126.10  245.11   271    102.69  175.43 
p-value of t-test      (0.009)   (0.045)       (0.092)  (0.056) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.011)  (0.054)      (0.082)  (0.081) 
                 
WEW  227    -106.69  -119.49  289    -4.74  97.08 
p-value of t-test      (0.081)  (0.342)      (0.921)  (0.572) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.112)  (0.331)      (0.557)  (0.845) 
                 
WEL  186    -19.99  -46.10  241    -55.24  -113.29 
p-value of t-test      (0.704)  (0.604)      (0.181)  (0.223) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.849)  (0.440)      (0.275)  (0.216) 
                 
SEL  146    32.44  -53.07  115    75.39  -36.80 
p-value of t-test      (0.635)  (0.762)      (0.181)  (0.823) 




Predictability of betting odds: regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results explaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) subsequent 
to the soccer games. The dependent variables are CAR(1,2) and CAR(1,3). We define 4 dummy variables 
which indicate whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly 
expected to lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on the probability measure used, we 
label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when ProbDiff. is used). PostMarch is 
equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is 
listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an 
away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is a national cup game and zero otherwise. The p-values of the 
estimated coefficients are in parentheses. All regressions have 916 observations. 
***, 
**, 
* stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
   Specification [a]  Specification [b] 
  CAR(1,2)  CAR(1,3)  CAR(1,2)  CAR(1,3) 
         
Constant  -130.58  -214.10  -127.83  -199.99 






  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.033)  (0.045) 
WEL  1.49  5.67  -7.66  -13.87 
  (0.966)  (0.897)  (0.812)  (0.729) 
SEL  36.04  37.61  28.10  16.98 
  (0.353)  (0.435)  (0.495)  (0.740) 
PostMarch  -32.94  -6.59  -32.38  -5.97 
  (0.254)  (0.854)  (0.263)  (0.868) 
AIM  43.60  72.91  49.05  74.56 
  (0.899)  (0.865)  (0.887)  (0.862) 
Home  -9.71  20.93  -5.02  30.04 
  (0.737)  (0.560)  (0.864)  (0.409) 
Cup  -3.68  -18.12  -3.73  -16.18 












  (0.043)  (0.025)  (0.039)  (0.020) 
Team Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
R
2  0.036  0.036  0.034  0.033 
F-Statistics  1.38
*  1.39
*  1.32  1.25 
Prob > F  0.10  0.10  0.14  0.19 
 